See Robert Charles Clark，supra n．9．，pp．142—146．
ALI，Principles of Corporate Governance—Analysis and Recommendations，2005（hereinafter Principles），§5．07 Comm．a．
Notes，The Effect of Common Directors in lnter—corporate Transactions，81 U．Pa．L．Rev．598（1933）．
See Harold Marsh，Are Directors Trustees？—Conflict of lnterest and Corporate Morality，22 Bus．Law．35，36—39（1967）．
See Stanford J．Grossman ＆ Oliver D．Hart，The Costs and Benefits of ownership：A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration,94 J．Pol．Econ．691 （1986）．
See Alison Grey Anderson，Conflicts of Interest：Efficiency，Fairness and Corporate Structure，25 U．C．L．A．L．Rev．738，749—759（1978）．
See Harold Demsetz，The Cost of Transacting，82 Q．J．Econ．33，33—34（1968）．
Krie r＆ Montgomery，Resource Allocation，lnformation Cost and the Form of Government Intervention，13 NAT．．RES．J．89，95（1973）（quoted in Alison Grey Anderson，supra n．，at 745）．
See Graham Moffat，Gerry Bean ＆ John Dewar，Trusts Law：Text and Materials，4th ed．，Cambridge，Cambridge University Press，2005，pp．435 —436．
Aberdeen Rly Co．v．Blaikie Bros（1854）1 Macq 461（qutoted．in Robert R．Pennington，Company Law，8th ed．，London Butterworths（tm）， 2001，p．727）．
See Harold Marsh，supra n．14，at 36—39．但是，对此也有持相反的观点的，例如美国Norwood P．Beveridge教授就认为在1880年以前美国普通法对待董事利益冲突交易的态度并非是“绝对的可撤销规则”；相反，即使是在普通法背景下，也从来没有这样一个严格的规则说利害关系董事交易是被禁止的。See Norwood P．Beveridge，Jr．，Interested Director Contracts at Common Law—validation at the Doctrine of Constructive Fraud，33Loy．L．A．L．Rev．97（1999）．
See Guth v．Loft Inc．，5 A．2d 503，510（Dd，1939）．
United States Rolling Stock co．v．Atlantic ＆ G．w．R．R．，34 Ohio St．450（1878）（common directors）；．Budd v．Walla Printing ＆ Publishing Co．，2 Wash．Terr．347，7 Pac．896（1885）（ contract between director and his corporation）（quoted in Notes，supra n．，at 336）．
See Graham Moffat，Gerry Bean ＆ john Dewar，supra n．19，p．435—440．
TTO AND OTHERS v．WADDELL AND OTHERS（No．2）（1977）ch 106．See also Graham Moffat，Gerry：Bean ＆John Dewar，id．，p．435．
Notes，supra n．103，at 338．
See Harold Marsh，suprd n．14，at 43．
See Decision，Corporations—Common Directors—Judicial Interference with Inter—Corporate Transactions，38 Colum．L．Rev．348（1938）．
See Harold Marsh，Supra n．14，at 43，48．
Principles§5．02 n．1．
See Franklin A．Gevurtz，Corporation Law，St．Paul．MINN．，West Group，2000，p．324．
See Ahmed Bulbulia ＆ Arthur R．Pinto，supra n．7．
自从ALI发布Principles之后，美国公司法学界也有学者不断质疑Principles，尤其认为Principles中关于受信义务部分的规定与美国现行
公司法不符。See John F．．Johnston ＆ Frederick H．Alexander，The Effect of Disinterested Director Approval of Conflict Transactions under the ALI Corporate Governance Project——A Practitioner’s Perspective，48 Bus．Law．1393（1993）．甚至有学者直接抨击道：“‘公平交易义务’一语是一个不幸的失败，因为非受信义务人也会有善意和公平交易的义务，但却不一定负有受信人之忠实义务。用同一个语词来形容两个完全不同的义务．只是徒增费解而已。”See Norwood P．Beveridge，Jr．，The Corporate Directo’s Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty：Understanding the Self—Interested Director Transaction ，41 DePaul L．Rev．655，656（1992）．
