T. R. S. Allan, “The Constitutional Foundation of Judicial Review: Conceptual Conundrum or Interpretative Inquiry?” , (2002) Cambridge Law Journal 87.
M. Elliot, The Constitutional Foundations of Judicial Review (Hart, 2001), pp.252－253. 正如批评者所指出的，这样一来，爱略特所支持的越权理论与传统越权理论已经相去十万八千里了。我们甚至可以认为，他实际上已经抛弃了越权理论。P. Craig & Nicholas Bamforth, “Constitutional Analysis, Constitutional Principle and Judicial Review”, (2001) Public Law 763.
T. R. S. Allan, “Doctrine and Theory in Administrative Law: An Elusive Quest for the Limits of Jurisdiction”, (2002) Public Law 429.
这一原则是欧盟法院在Costa 和Simmenthal 案件中确定的，英国上议院在Factortame (no.2)案件中接受了该原则。See R. v. Secretary of State for Transports, ex parte Factortame Ltd (no.2) AC 603.
M. J. Detmold, The Australian Commonwealth: A Fundamental Analysis of Its Constitution (Law Book Company, 1985), p.97. Detmold是澳大利亚学者，也是澳大利亚学者中批评议会主权的领头人物。
T. R. S. Allan, Law, Liberty and Justice: The Legal Foundations of British Constitutionalism (Clarendon, 1993), p.10.
R. Brazier, Constitutional Reform: Reshaping the British Political System (2nd, Oxford, 1998), p.155.
韦德评论说，就“前届议会不能拘束后届议会”这一信条而言，议会主权理论在此发生了革命性的变化。W. Wade, “What Has Happened to the Sovereignty of Parliament?”, (1991) Law Quarterly Review 1, and “Sovereignty —Revolution or Evolution”, (1996) Law Quarterly Review 568. Also see, John EEkelaar, “The Death of Parliamentary Sovereignty—A Comment”, (1997) Law Quarterly Review 185. 但克雷格倾向于认为，这只是一个法律解释规则的问题。P. Craig, “Sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament after Factortame”, (1991) Yearbook of European Law 221.
Alison L. Young, “Judicial Sovereignty and the Human Rights Act 1998”, (2002) Cambridge Law Journal 53.
Barnes Woolf, “Droit Public -- English Style”, (1995) Public Law 57, at 69.
John Laws, “Law and Democracy”, (1995) Public Law 72, at 87, 92. Also see, “The Constitution, Morals and Rights” (1996) Public Law 622, at 635.
为议会主权的最新辩护，参见Jeffrey Goldsworthy, The Sovereignty of Parliament: History and Philosophy (Clarendon, 1999).
“Blunkett to fight asylum ruling” (Feb 20, 2001 ), http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/2779343.stm;
R. Cranston, “Reviewing Judicial Review”, in G. Richardson & H. Genn, Administrative Law and Government Action (Oxford, 1994); “Justifying Judicial Review”, used in C. Harlow & R. Rawlings, Law and Administration (Butterworths, 1997), chap 17, and also in M. Elliot, The Constitutional Foundations of Judicial Review (Hart, 2001), chap 1.
W. Wade, “Constitutional Realities and Judicial Prudence”, in C. Forsyth (ed), Judicial Review and the Constitution (Hart, 2000), p431. 文中提及的“司法浪漫主义驱使下的司法至上主义”的批评，参见Lord Irvine of Lairg, “Judges and Decision-Makers: The Theory and Practice of Wednesbury Review”, (1996) Public Law 59, at 77.
这一点我们从他《行政法》导言那饱含激情的文字中不难读出来。W. Wade & C. Forsyth, Administrative Law (8th, Oxford, 2000), pp.1-19. 当韦德第一次提出“行政法的基本原则是越权无效”时，他强调越权原则本身就是普通法的产物：“显然，司法对行政的控制建立在法院固有的管辖权至上，虽然它几乎处处与制定法有关……最终说来，行政法的基础是普通法，它通过具体的法律原则实施法治。”W. Wade, Administrative Law (3rd, Clarendon, 1971), p.51. 在他的
宪法原理系列讲座中，韦德甚至说，“凯尔森意义上的基本规则，或者哈特意义上的承认规则，是掌握在法官的手里，并由他们来决定什么样的制定法是有效的……在这个基本问题上，法官才是主权者”。W. Wade, Constitutional Fundamentals (revised ed., Stevens & Sons, 1989), p.33.
] P. Craig, “Ultra Vires and the Foundations of Judicial Review”, (1998) Cambridge Law Journal 63, at 86-7;
